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Off-Floor Trading,
Disintegration, and the Bid-Ask
Spread in Experimental Markets
I. Introduction
This study has its origin in a series of meetings
between the authors and various futures market
exchange officials. Our interest was in identi-
fying one or more research questions, arising
in the ordinary operation of an exchange, that
mighl he capable of examination using experi-
mental methods. We wanted the scrutiny of ex-
change officials and their assistance in helping to
define a set of questions that we thought would
he rescarchable hy laboratory experimentation.
Initially we discussed a wide range of issues, in-
cluding the prohlem of "off-floor" trading, which
ultimately was the research focus that we mutu-
ally agreed would be a good starting candidate.
We selected this problem for a number of
reasons.
I) All futures and stock exchanges have rules
that prohibit the members of an exchange
from engaging in unauthorized off-floor trades.'
I. For example, rule 520 of the Chicago Mercantile Ex-
change (1985) slates that "All irading for future delivery in
commodities traded on the Exchange must be confined to
transactions made on ihe Exchange floor in the designated
Irading area during Irading hours. . . . Any member violating
this rule shall be guilty of a major offense."
(Journal of Business. 1991. vol. 64. no. 4)
ie.t 1991 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.
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This article uses exper-
imental methods to
establish Ihat greater
uncertainty in the envi-
ronment increases the
naturally emerging
bid-ask spread in
double-auction trad-
ing. The opportunity to
trade off floor is then
introduced. Off-floor
trading is greater in the
environment with a
wider bid-ask spread,
increases with block
trading, and increases
still more with increas-
ing subject experience.
Finally, we find that
the preponderance of
off-floor trades are in-
side the bid-ask spread,
supporting the hypoth-
esis that a motive for
such trades is to split
privately the gain rep-
resented by the bid-ask
spread without reveal-
ing publicly a willing-
ness to make price
concessions.
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Consequently, the problem is of general interest within the securities
industry, and we are able to ask whether such rules are warranted hy
the results we ohtain in laboratory experimentation.
2) Off-floor trading in futures markets is known to occur in spite of
penalties that have been levied on exchange members who violate
these rules. This suggests that there exist endogenous incentives strong
enough to overcome the penalty strictures intended to prevent such
trading activity.
3) The frequency of occurrence, as well as an understanding of the
circumstance of individual violations, is not known precisely by ex-
change officials. The fact that off-floor trades are prohibited and pun-
ishable as a major offense, and therefore are clandestine, makes it
impossible to gather systematic field data on off-floor trades. Essen-
tially, experimental evidence is the only feasible source of observa-
tions on off-floor trading.
4) OfT-floor trading illustrates a research prohlem that bas not yet
received attention in the published literature of experimental econom-
ics: if an individual voluntarily elects to forgo trade in an organized
market and to trade instead hy bilateral bargaining with another indi-
vidual, then we have an example of endogenous choice hetween two
institutions of exchange.
5) Finally, we judged that we would he ahle to develop a set of
experimental procedures and designs that would make the off-floor
trading prohlem researchable by laboratory methods.
11. Related Background Literature
The question of whether it is socially desirable to permit off-floor pri-
vate trades is best understood by recognizing that securities and fu-
tures trading involves three different markets: the market for securi-
ties, the market for dealer services (see Schwartz [1988. pp. 427-28]
for a discussion of these two), hut also the market for the services of
exchanges. Prior to 1975 the Securities and Exchange Commission had
supported the industry's carte! for fixing minimum commission fees.
This price-fixing was rendered viable to the extent of enforcement of
the rules prohibiting off-exchange trading. The Securities Acts Amend-
ments of 1975 sought two important changes: to eliminate all unjusti-
fied competitive constraints in securities traditig, and to mandate the
development of a National Market System. The result of the first pro-
scription was to remove the fixing of commissions. This has resulted
in a suhstantially more competitive market for dealer .services and in
lower commission rates. The mandate for a National Market System
has resulted in the Intermarket Trading System linking the national and
regional exchanges; also, we now have an over-the-counter automated
quotation and trading system. This has increased competition in the
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market for exchange services (see Hamilton [1987. 1988] for studies of
the trading of New York Stock Exchange [NYSEJ-listed securities on
the regional exchanges; also Garbade and Silber 1979).
These changes, which have increased dealer competition and market
integration, have left unresolved the question. Should otT-floor trading
he permitted on a given exchange? Schwartz (1988. p. 498) suggests
that "off-board trading restrictions appear lo have some justification"
because traders benefit socially (lower-bid spreads, price efficiency)
from order consolidation. But because of a "public good" problem,
individual incentives may not be compatible with order consolidation.
Our explicit interpretation is as follows: contracts listed on an ex-
change are successful trading instruments only to the extent that they
accommodate trading activities of agents that were previously unavail-
able (e.g.. the Standard and Poor futures index) or only available at
the higher transaction cost of a disintegrated market {e.g.. the original
over-the-counter trading of stock puts and calls). But on listing a new
contract, an exchange also provides a central place where interested
traders meet, making it possible to trade off floor at minimum search
cost and to free ride on the available competitive price information to
lower negotiation cost. Hence off-floor trades based on the bid-ask
spread may be cost-efficient for certain traders who complement each
other through reputation or block-trading frequency.
But why should off-floor trading qualify market performance? Co-
hen. Conroy. and Maier (1985) use a queuing-theory model of trading
to show Ihat disintegration (relative to order consolidation, which
maintains price priority in double-auction trading) produces wider bid-
ask spreads and increased price volatility. Using simulation methods,
similar results are obtained by these authors when time priority is
violated. Our computerized exchange maintains a strict price-priority
rule with tied bid (or offer) prices ranked by a time-priority rule. Both
price and time priority are violated in our experiments when traders
negotiate off-floor bilateral contracts. Under a clearinghouse regime,
Mendelson (1987) demonstrates that fragmentation (disintegration) re-
duces the expected volume and expected gains from exchange while
increasing the price variance faced by traders. Although our market is
a continuous auction, these predictions receive qualitative support by
our results.
111. Design Considerations and Motivation
The research questions we investigate in this report did not spring full
blown at the project's inception; they evolved and were articulated
gradually over a series of experiments interspaced among feedback
discussions with exchange officials. After our initial discussions we
designed an experiment intended to provide an explicit exogenous
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transactions fee differential between on-floor computerized double-
auction trading of single units and off-fioor private bilateral block
trades. This served as our first, baseline 1. experiment (1 in table 1)
showing clearly what everybody expected, namely, that the a priori
predicted division of trades between the two institutions would occur
in the laboratory using reward-motivated subjects. This experiment
provided a vehicle for focusing the next round of discussions on the
elements driving off-fioor trading as conjectured by exchange officials.
A number of questions emerged from this and subsequent discussions.
Will the phenomenon of off-floor trading be observed in an environ-
ment in which there is no explicit transactions cost saving and no block
trades? How much off-floor trading occurs relative to on-floor trading?
Does off-floor trading persist with experience over time? The challenge
here was to create an environment in which the decision to trade off
floor was entirely endogenous, unmotivated by exogenous conditions.
Is the extent and persistence of off-floor trading influenced by design
treatments that increase the (naturally emerging) bid-ask spread? This
latter question resulted from the conjecture of exchange officials that
off-floor trades were motivated by the mutual gains at prices inside the
bid-ask spread. If off-floor trades are observed in the weakly motiva-
ting environment of single-unit trading, will such trades increase when
subjects can trade blocks of units off floor?- The above questions led
to the design and execution of the five new baseline 2 experiments
and five treatment experiments listed in table 1. An "x" following an
experiment number, for example, "5x." refers to the use of once-
experienced subjects, while "xx" refers to twice-experienced sub-
jects; otherwise subjects are inexperienced. Three of the baseline
experiments (2, 3, 4) used an environment in which the static supply-
and-demand equilibrium was unchanging over the 15 periods of trad-
ing; two (7. 8) used an environment in which the equilibrium was
shifted randomly in each of the 15 periods of trading. In these baselines
no off-fioor trading opportunities were provided. The objective was to
test our conjecture that the naturally emerging bid-ask spread in the
static environment would be narrower than the bid-ask spread that
emerged in the random environment. The purpose was to establish
that we had indeed created two environments with different endoge-
nous bid-ask spreads that were independent of the occurrence of off-
fioor trading. This provided baseline controls for comparison with sub-
sequent "treatment" experiments in which subjects were given the
r
2. Of course, block trades can be executed on all exchanges, but traditionally under
a rule that prohibits all-or-none bids or offers (see Chicago Mercantile Exchange 1985
rule 523; and New York Stock Exchange 1987. pp. 2061-62). Of course no such restric-
tion would apply in rule-violating off-floor negotiation. Ironically, rules prohibiting all-
or-none bids and offers might provide an incentive for violating rules against off-floor
trading.
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Opportunity to make bilateral trades off floor. In the treatment experi-
ments we ask: (1) will subjects trade off floor? (2) will off-floor trades
be greater in the random than in the static supply-and-demand environ-
ment? (3) will off-floor trading in the random environment be greater
for block trades than for single-unit trades?
Since our results provided generally affirmative answers to these
questions, in our final experiment (llxx) we collected data designed
to answer the question. Do off-floor trades occur at prices that are
predominately inside the bid-ask spread standing at the time of execu-
tion? If so, this is confirmatory evidence that the motivation for off-
floor trades is to split the gain measured by the bid-ask spread.
IV. Experimental Design and Trading Mechanisms
A. Experimental Design
We use standard monetary reward procedures to induce controlled
supply-and-demand schedules in each period of every market experi-
ment (see Smith 1976). Our experimental design uses the schedules
shown in figure 1; these are known to the experimenter but are not
known by any subject. In experiments 2-llxx (table I), the induced
supply and demand, measured in deviations from the center of the set
of competitive equilibrium prices, is shown in figure \h. There are five
buyers and five sellers. Three of the buyers (B,, B^, B,,) each have a
capacity to buy up to 6 units, while two of the buyers {Bj, B,,,) have a
capacity to buy up to 3 units in any single trading period. Symmetri-
cally, three sellers (5,-, 5^, SJ can sell up to 6 units, and two (5,, SJ
can sell up to 3 units. Any particular buyer (seller) subject was assigned
randomly to one of the step positions {ij, k. m, n) at the beginning of
each of the 3 weeks (5-day trading periods) in an experiment. A buyer's
profit is determined by computing the difference between his/her as-
signed value and purchase price in the market for each unit bought. In
figure \h, if the equilibrium price is $3.00. then B^ has 6 units valued
at $3.40. If a unit is purchased at $3.05, then B, makes a profit of $3.40
- $3.05 = $0.35 on that unit. Consequently, B, has a well-defined
maximum willingness to pay of $3.40 for each unit. The cumulative
profit on all units purchased in all 15 periods is paid in cash to each
buyer at the end of the experiment. Thus the incentive of each buyer is
to buy as low as possible but to balance this gain against the increased
uncertainty of making a trade at lower prices. A seller's profit is com-
puted by subtracting his/her assigned cost from the selling price of
each unit sold. If 5^  was the seller of the unit at price $3.05 to buyer
fi, in the above example, then the seller's profit is $3.05 - $2.80 =
$0.25. The maximum possible profit that can be earned by the 10 sub-
jects in an experiment is simply the area between the supply-and-
demand schedules, which is shown as "Gains from Exchange" in fig-
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ures la and \b. since this measures the maximum aggregate gains from
exchange achievable through market trade. Market efficiency is well
defined as the ratio of the total profits actually realized in any trading
period to the maximum profits shown in figure \b. A market is 100%
efficient if and only if 18 units trade and buyer B„ and seller S„ trade
none of their units.
In experiments 6x-llxx (table 1) subjects were not only assigned
randomly by 5-day weeks to the steps shown in figure \h. but in addi-
tion a random constant (positive or negative) was added each period
to all buyer values and all seller costs. Consequently, in these experi-
ments, the competitive equilibrium price was shifted randomly each
period. This provided increased price and transaction uncertainty rela-
tive to those experiments (2-5x) in which only the step assignments
were randomized.
In our first baseline 1 experiment, the value and cost assignments to
buyers and sellers remained constant over the entire 15-period trading
horizon. The resulting supply-and-demand arrays are shown in figure
la. In this experiment all on-floor "electronic" trades were subject to
a 23 cent per unit "commission" fee. The supply-and-demand sched-
ules in figure ]a are computed net of the 25 cent charges levied on the
buyer and seller in each trade.^
B. The PLATO Double-Auction Mechanism
In each experiment exchange trading occurs via our PLATO computer
double-auction software program written by Ariington Williams (1980).
The screen display for a subject (buyer 5) in experiment 11 xx is shown
in figure 2. The upper panel of the screen contains buyer 5's private
record sheet for all transactions in week 2 (periods 6-10). In period 6
buyer 5 had the capacity to buy a maximum of 6 units, each valued at
$6.83, but bought only 2 units via PLATO—the first for $6.60. yielding
a profit of $.23, the second for $6.67. giving a profit of $. 16. Buyer 5
in week 2 had the position B^ shown in figure \b on the step that is
$.20 above the equilibrium price; that is, the equilibrium price was
$6.63 in period 6 and $4.23 in period 7. Just below the record sheet
appears the standing bid and/or offer, which is public information for
all subjects. All traders see that currently a buyer has a standing bid
to buy at $4.12 and a seller has a standing offer to sell at $4.43. Any
buyer is free to accept the standing offer by touching the outlined box
area labeled "accept offer"; he/she then has up to 5 seconds to confirm
3. !n the static environment of baseline 1 (fig. la), the bid-ask spread converged to
minuscule levels. In order lo test the key hypothesis of the study we needed a design
for the subsequent experiments in which the bid-ask spread would converge to a wider
level than we had observed in experiment 1. This led us to widen the tunnel of competi-
tive equilibrium prices (cf. figs. la and ]b) in addition to introducing the random supply-
and-demand environment.
Off-Floor Trading 503
WEEK 2
RECORD SHEET for BUYER 5
Unit 1 resale '-alue
Unit 1 purcba=-2 price
Pro f11
Unit 2 resale value
Unit 2 purchase price
Pro f11
Unit 3 resale value
Unit 3 purchase price
Profit
Unit 4 resale value
Unit 4 purchase price
Profit
U n i t 5 r e s a l e v a l u e
Unit 5 purcha=* price
Profit
Unit 6 resale value
Unit 6 purchase price
Pro f11
Total Profit for Period
TRADING PERIOD
6
6.83
6.60
0.23
6 . 8 3
6 . 6 7
0 . 1 6
6 . 8 3
6 . 8 3
6 . 8 3
6.83
0.39
7
4. 43
4. 43
4. 43
4.43
4.43
4. 43
8
Ccolumnsj
9 10
R BUYER BIDS $4.12 fl SELLER OFFERS $4 .43
ContractsM.45,4.44,4.42,4.35.4.3 6,4.28
Trading Period 7 now in progress. SECONDS REMfllNING:
FIG. 2.—PLATO screen display for a buyer
28
by touching the box area labeled "confirm contract." Similarly any
seller may touch his/her "accept bid" box. then confirm. The resulting
contract is binding, and the auction for I unit ends. PLATO then waits
for a new bid and offer from the "floor" if there are no bids or offers
stored in the "electronic book." The box on the left allows a subject
to enter a new bid (offer). Suppose buyer 5 desires to place a new bid
at $4.35. He/she types this number on the keyboard and confirms that
it has appeared (privately) to the right of the arrow pointed at the " $ "
symbol. By pressing the touch-sensitive box labeled "enter bid." this
number, adjacent to the arrow, disappears and reappears publicly as
the new standing bid, replacing the previous bid at $4.12.^
4. Note that the PLATO mechanism uses many of the New York Slock Exchange
rules. As we see in this example a standing bid (offer) is subject to an improvement rule:
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We want to emphasize that bids, offers, and acceptances are exe-
cuted quickly on PLATO. There is no delay like that occurring in
negotiating a trade off floor using the procedures described below. All
our traders are principals operating for their own accounts; there are
no dealers or specialists trading for the accounts of others. The bid-ask
spread, if and when it exists at any time during an experiment, is
entirely a naturally occurring endogenous event. The experimenters
have no direct control over the bid-ask spread, only the possibility of
indirect control via the introduction of induced supply-and-demand
uncertainty in the environments.
At the bottom of the screen under the touch-sensitive boxes, the
last several contracts (up to a maximum of eight) are listed in their
historical sequence. Below this line of contracts the subject is re-
minded that period 7 is now in progress and that the number of seconds
remaining is 28. In the experiments reported here the length of each
period is 240 seconds.
C. Off-Floor Bilateral Bargaining
After reviewing the PLATO instructions in all off-floor trading experi-
ments, supplemental instructions were read aloud while subjects fol-
lowed their own printed handout sheets. In each period, subjects could
trade the units on their screen either in the PLATO market or off floor.
Buyers and sellers were seated alternatively so that each buyer (seller)
had a seller (buyer) on each side with whom they could trade off floor.
Each buyer (seller) was given bid (offer) tickets on which they could
write a bid (offer). If a buyer (seller) wished to submit a bid (offer) off
floor, he/she held the ticket in the direction of the seller (buyer) to
whom they wished to submit the bid (offer). One of four experimenters
then placed the ticket on the appropriate subject's table and the subject
marked •"accept" or "reject." The ticket was then returned forthwith
to the person who submitted it. Off-floor trades and profits were re-
corded manually in tables supplied to each subject.
The seating arrangements and parameter randomization determined
potential off-floor trading partners. In these experiments we made no
attempt to match high-volume (i.e., 6-unit) buyers and sellers. In the
off-floor block-trading experiments, subjects could trade units off floor
in blocks of three. This means that agents endowed with only 3 units
any new bid musl be bigher and any new offer must be lower than ihe ciineni standing
bid and offer (see NYSE 1987. rules 70. 71). All bids and offers outside Ihe standing
bid-ask spread are placed in a price priority rank-queue or "electronic book"; tied prices
are secondarily ranked by a time-priority rule. Bids and offers once standing cannot be
withdrawn (see NYSE 1987, rule 72|e|). but those in the queue can be cancelled at any
lime by the maker. The standing bid (offer) is public, but ihe queue is not (see NYSE
1987, rule 115).
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would trade their entire endowment if they traded off floor: others
might trade 3 units off and 3 units on, or all 6 on (or off) the floor.
It should be noted that off-floor trading must inevitably take more
time than electronic trading, and this would tend to inhibit off-floor
trading, although less so for block trades. But this is true for naturally
occurring markets as well as for our experimental markets. Our proce-
dures were designed to minimize the mechanical (not negotiation) ef-
fort required to make otf-floor trades since we did not want such trades
to be unduly influenced by artifactual mechanical difficulties.^
I I
V. Experimental Results
I
A. Off-Floor Trading to Save Transactions Cost
It is evident that, if block trades off floor can effect savings in transac-
tions cost, this can provide an external incentive to choose bilateral
off-floor exchange over electronic exchange. In experiment 1, 12 sub-
jects were assigned randomly to the normalized value/cost positions
shown in figure \a. Each subject had the right to trade 6 units. The
trading fee of $.25 on all PLATO trades was automatically deducted
from each buyer and each seller's profit on each transaction. Net of
commission fees the equilibrium price range, normalized on the com-
petitive equilibrium price, is ( -0.05, 0.05). and the corresponding vol-
ume is 27 units.
Supplemental instructions informed all subjects that after period 5
some buyers and sellers would have the option of executing 6-unit
block trades outside PLATO at a flat commission fee of $.80. Thus if
a subject traded 6 units per period in the PLATO market, total commis-
sion fees would be $L50as opposed to $.80 if those 6 units were traded
off floor. Prior to each period (after period 5), three buyers and three
sellers were allowed to submit off-floor block-trade contract proposals
to one another via an experimenter. If a proposal was accepted, the
buyer and seller involved traded all 6 units at a standard contract price
5. A referee poses the following substantive issue: "Was there any attempt to see
how the thickness or thinness of the market affected off-floor exchange? If the PLATO
market is thin. i.e.. time between trades (is lengthened), is there a greater probability
of trading olT-tioor?" Since the answer to the first question is "no." we have no empirical
data for answering the second question. But an assumption underlying our e.x peri menial
design was that market volume might Indeed affect off-lloor trading. Hence all of the
experiments 2-1 Ixx controlled lor this using supply-and-demand designs with an equilib-
rium exchange volume of 18 units per period. Since each period lasted 240 seconds, the
average time (theoretically) between contracts is 13.3 seconds, which was the same for
all experiments. One could study this factor in a controlled manner by increasing the
length of each of the induced price limit steps in fig. ih by some multiple—2. 3.
etc.—which would increase volume by the same amount and reduce average time be-
tween trades proportionately.
506 Journal of Business
0.15
0.10
0.05
0.00
-0.05
-0.10
-0.15
-0.20
EXPERIMENT 1 . PLATO MEAN PRICE
TOTAL EFFICIENCY (percentage)
97.9 99.2 m 98.5100 84.199.4 99.4 99.4 9 9 . 4 1 1 9 9 . 4 1 0 0 HO
9 10 n ? 13 14 15
COMPfcTITIVE EQUILIBRIUM IS 27 UNITS
o =
7 8 9 in 11 12 13 14 15
PERIOD
0 \ Z 3 A
FIG. 3.—Baseline 1 experiment; block off-floor trading at reduced fee
determined by the average PLATO price in the period.'' The mean
price. PLATO and off-floor volume., and total market efficiency in each
period are shown in figure 3. The average PLATO price is always
within the competitive range, and the total (PLATO plus off-floor)
volume is always within 3 units of the equilibrium level. In periods
7-15 all subjects with the opportunity to trade off floor did so. The
prediction was for 18 units to trade off floor, and for 9 units to trade
via the PLATO terminals. In period 6. one buyer did not accept an
off-floor proposal and only 12 units were traded off floor. Since mean
prices declined in each of the first 6 periods, it was reasonable for this
buyer to expect that by trading on floor he might beat the standard
fi. This "standard-contract." average-floor-pHce rule was imposed by the experiment-
ers lo rcpresenl Ihe kind of informal agreement that mighl arise among block traders for
after-hours irading. After preliminary discussions, experiment I was developed as the
pilot experimeni we used to focus our dialogue with exchange officials lo demonstrate
one set of incentive conditions under which off-floor trading might occur and lo calibrate
their thinking with ours on the potential for using experimental methods. Il also provided
pilol experience for the experimenters In a new area of research. Once we saw how to
fashion the procedures for the auxiliary market, we eliminated the idea of a "standard
conlrdct" and allowed all off-floor trades to be freely negotiated.
Off-Floor Trading SV7
mean contract price applying to ofT-floor trades. After period 6,
PLATO prices are nearly constant and within the competitive range
even though two-thirds of the volume was off floor. The failure to
observe a degradation in market efficiency with 60% of all trades off
floor simply illustrates the robustness of the double-auction institution
in producing competitive outcomes in stationary environments. This
has been demonstrated in hundreds of experiments over the years (see
Smith 1976, 1982: and Williams 1980). The use of an afterperiod stan-
dard contract to price off-floor trades controlled for any interference
between off-floor and electronic trading. When we relax this control
and also introduce greater uncertainty in the supply/demand environ-
ment, as in the experiments reported below, we shall flnd more degra-
dation in market efficiency.
B, Establishing the Performance Characteristics of Baseline
Environments without Off-Floor Trading
We next studied the performance characteristics of two different envi-
ronments with differing degrees of external induced supply-and-
demand uncertainty. In experiments 2~4 the competitive equilibrium
price and quantity were constant over all periods, while in experiments
7 and 8 the competitive equilibrium price level shifted at random each
period. Our a priori prediction was that the second condition would
yield greater price volatility than the first. We also expected the bid-ask
spread, when it exists, to widen under the second condition relative
to the first. A measurement problem with the latter prediction is that
contracts may and often do occur without a defined bid-ask spread, or
before that spread has a chance to natTow. Thus, a bid may be entered
and accepted before an ask price is established. Figure 4 provides
charts of mean prices by period for all the baseline 2 experiments and
summaries of mean volume and efficiency by period across each of
the two groups of experiments.^
Table 2 lists the mean volume per period, mean price deviation, price
variance, mean square error of prices (variance relative to predicted
equilibrium), and the mean and median observed bid-ask spread at the
7. Notice the tendency of the mean price to lie in the lower half of the tunnel in both
treatments. The hypothesis that the mean prices are greater than or equal to zero is
rejected at the .01 Ievel(r(l4) = -32.3. constant; -5.98. random). The ability of buyers
in double-auction trading to extract a larger share of the surplus has been noted before
{see Smith and Williams 1982). Although explanations have been conjectured (subjects
are more likely to have experience as buyers than as sellers), the cause is unknown.
The experienced sessions reported below exhibit less bias in favor of buyers. In the
baselines the equilibrium volume was traded 24 times, but 100% efticiency was reached
only six of those times. A necessary and sufficient condition for 100% efficiency is that
alt intramargina! units trade. The relatively low prices allow trading of extramarginal
units, resulting in less-than-complete realization of the maximum gains from exchange
(profits).
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time of contract for all PLATO trades. The same data (except for the
spread) are listed for all off-floor contracts. Finally, the fraction of
total volume that occurs off floor, and market efficiency, are listed in
the last two columns. All statistics arc computed across all periods
and contracts in each experiment. We measure "the spread" in two
ways. First, where a bid is accepted to form a contract but no ask is
entered, we define the standing offer as $9.99. the maximum possible
price that PLATO will accept; if there is an offer price being accepted,
but no bid, we define the "standing bid" as $.01. the minimum possible
price that PLATO will accept. In this way we are able to utilize all the
information content of our data; this definition requires only the weak
assumption that any seller would be willing to sell at $9.99 and any
buyer would be willing to buy for $.01. Defining the spread in this way
for outlier cases leads to some large erratic observations under all
treatment conditions. In order not to weight such observations unduly,
we use the median as the measure of central tendency. Second, when
there is either no bid or no ask at the time of contract, we exclude
the observation and compute the mean spread using the remaining
observations.
From table 2. comparing the constant and random environments
(experiments 2-4 with 7-8). the latter increases the price variance,
mean square error, and the mean and median spread, all by a factor
of about two. Further comparisons will be provided below in Sec-
tion F.
C. Will Off-Floor Trades Occur When Single Units Can Be
Traded?
From these results we were satisfied that we had successfully created
two environments with differing bid-ask spreads. Recall that the impor-
tance of this resides in the fact that we exercise no direct control over
the naturally occurring bid-ask spread. Given two environments with
differing levels for the bid-ask spread, we ask. Will we observe off-
floor trading? Will we observe more off-floor trading in the environ-
ment known independently to yield a wider bid-ask spread?
In both questions we restrict off-floor trades to the single-unit condi-
tion judged to provide the weakest incentive to trade off floor. We
were skeptical as to whether off-floor trades would occur in these
environments. Our skepticism grew out of the fact that for a trader to
opt for off-floor trading he/she had to substitute a market with a lesser
trading opportunity for one with a greater trading opportunity. Any
off-floor bid (offer) could always be entered more quickly on PLATO
and exposed to a larger number of potential acceptors. The disadvan-
tage of such action might be to "spoil" the market by advertising to
all a willingness to trade at a concessionary price. Making the bid
(offer) off floor maintains privacy withoui forgoing the option of re-
turning to the floor.
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Figure 5 charts the mean price deviation and volume by period both
off floor and on PLATO for experiments 5x and 6x. In table 2 the price
variance and mean square error are greater in 6x than in 5x for both
PLATO and off-floor contracts; the mean and median spread are both
greater in 6x than in 5x. Note (hat the spread data for 5x-6x are
not comparable with 2-4 and 7-8 because of differences in subject
experience (see n. 9 below). Finally, the mean off-floor volume in-
creases from 1.7 to 2.5 going from the constant to the random envi-
ronment.
D. Does Off-Floor Volume Increase with Block Trading?
Having established that off-floor trades occur under the weak endoge-
nous incentive condition of single-unit trades, we turned to a replica-
tion of the random equilibrium environment hut with block trading.
The hypothesis was that off-floor trading volume would increase in
this environment with block trading. We conducted two replications,
9x and lOx, with ditTercnl groups of once-experienced subjects, as in
6x. The results arc charted in figure 6. Comparing 9x and lOx with 6x
in table 2, the mean off-floor volume is increased with the introduction
of block trading from 2.5 in 6x to 4.5 and 3.6. respectively, in 9x and
lOx. The volatility and spread data suggest that these measures are not
systematically affected by the introduction of block trading.
E. Do Off Floor Trades Persist with Increased Experience?
At Prices Inside the Standiui* Bid-Ask Spread?
We now seek to examine the persistence of off-floor trading with in-
creased experience and to obtain direct evidence that off-floor trades
occur at ptices within the bid-ask spread.
Our final experiment used 10 subjects recruited from the pool of
subjects that had participated in experiments 9x and lOx. They were
therefore experienced in two of the previous l.*!-pcriod experiments
reported here. We thought such experienced subjects would be able
to handle the additional recording demands we placed on them. In
particular, with our monitoring assistance, we thought a subject would
be able to record quickly the PLATO clock time at which a bid (offer)
was tendered to an adjacent trader and that the receiving trader could
record the PLATO clock time at which the bid (offer) was accepted
or rejected. In fact, this extra procedural task worked smoothly with
little apparent interterence in the process. This procedure can be illus-
trated by the example we chose for display in figure 2. Note that buyer
5 faces a standing bid-ask of $4.12-$4.43. with 28 seconds remaining.
At time 28 buyer 5 conveyed a bid to seller 4. stating a willingness to
buy a 3-unit block at $4.35 (8 cents below the standing offer and 23
cents above the standing bid). At time 20 seller 4 checked "accept"
on the form and returned it to buyer number 5. These two traders
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made a timely trade for 3 units and still had 20 seconds left for addi-
tional trading effort.
From figure 7 and table 2, comparing 1 Ixx with 9x and lOx, we note
a substantial increase in off-floor volume, an increased bid-ask spread,
and an increase, both on and off floor, in the variance and mean square
error of price deviations. Thus off-floor trading not only persists but
increases with experience. Within experiment I Ixx. off-floor trading
also increases over time (flg. 7). as subjects become more experienced
in repeat period trading.
Tabie 3 reveals that (I) a preponderance of accepted off-floor trade
proposals are inside the bid-ask spread at the time of submission and
at the time of acceptance; (2) the number of proposals inside the bid-
ask spread, both accepted and rejected, and the mean bid-ask spread
all tend to increase across the 3 weeks of the experiment; and (3)
rejected proposals are much more likely to be outside the mean spread;
but note that the number of rejected proposals is far larger than the
number accepted. ,
F. Regression Tests of Hypotheses , '
Using dummy independent regression variables for the baseline and
treatment conditions and observations from 10 experiments we shall
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TABLE 3 Experiment llxx OfT-Floor Activity Relative tu Sunding PLATO
Bid/Ask Spread*
Off-Floor Activity Relative to Spread at Time of;
Periods
Accepted Proposals:
1-5
h-IO
11-15
Subtotal
Rejected Proposals:
1-5
6-10
11-15
Sublolal
All proposals:
1-5
6-10
11-15
Total
N
10
10
I?
35
145
138
140
423
155
148
155
458
Mean
Spread
.166
.186
.329
.241
.237
.291
.323
.284
.232
.283
.324
.280
Submission
Numbert
in
7
9
14
30
55
63
80
198
62
72
94
228
Out
2
1
0
3
77
64
54
195
79
65
54
198
Ind
1
0
1
2
13
11
6
30
14
11
7
32
Mean
Spread
.195
.138
.239
.197
.259
.259
.307
.275
.254
.250
.301
.269
Response
Number+
In
6
7
14
27
57
57
73
187
63
64
87
214
Out
3
3
0
6
71
68
56
195
74
71
56
201
Ind
1
0
I
•}
17
13
11
41
18
13
12
43
" Spread is Ihe difference belween slanding Pl.ATO bid iind olTer,
t ••In/i»il" refep. lo the number of nfl'-Hoor conlracl prices inside or outside, respeclivcly. the
releviinl spread. "Ind" means indclerminLint; Ihere was no standing hid and/or otTer at the time ol"
ihc off-floor contract. In period 5 Ihcrc was no standing tilTer on PLATO at the lime of an olT-fliwr
contract, bui ihe contract price was less than the standing bid; this trade is recorded as outside the
spread.
report ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates and hypothesis tests for
the questions posed in the previous discussion. The OLS regressions,
evaluating the marginal effects of the treatments on the price variance,
spread, pcr-period median spread, efficiency, and fraction of volume
off-floor, are shown in the top pane! of table 4. In each case the depen-
dent variable is regressed on the baseline dummy variables. C (= 1
for a constant competitive equilibrium Ice] environment, 0 otherwise)
and R ( - 1 for a random cc environment. 0 otherwise), and the off-
floor treatment variables. OSC (= I for single-unit constant ce. 0 oth-
erwise). OSR (= 1 for single-unit random ce. 0 otherwise), OBXI ( =
1 for block trading once experienced. 0 otherwise), 0BX2 (= 1 for
block trading twice experienced, 0 otherwise).
Appearing in the lower panel of table 4 are the Bonferroni r-values
and the nonparametric Mann-Whitney (y-statistic for joint tests of the
a priori ordering of the regression coefficients.** For example, in the
8. Since we are conducting mutliple comparisons of coefficients estimated from the
same dala set, we use the Bonferroni r-tcst (see Miller 1981). In this application we
report one-tailed /-values since Ihe original experimental design allowed an a priori
prediction of the sign of coefficient differences.
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baselines, the prediction is that the median spread is wider and effi-
ciency lower for R than for C; that is, the R environment is expected
to yield wider spreads, and for the gains from exchange to be lower.
Therefore the null hypothesis is that the median spread regression
coefficient for C is greater than that for R. The Bonferroni t is -4.06
for this comparison, and the negative sign indicates that Ihe R coeffi-
cient (.27) exceeds the C coefficient (.15). This is corroborated by the
nonparametric Mann-Whitney (/-test. Comparing the random (OSR)
with the constant (OSC) environment for off-floor single-unit trading,
the spread coefficients exhibit the predicted order, and in the (y-test the
difference is significant.*^ In contrast, there is no significant difference
between the spread for block (OBXI) and for single- (OSR) unit trading,
or between twice- (0BX2) and once- (OBXl) experienced traders. The
efficiency coefficients decline monolonically as we proceed down the
treatments from C to 0BX2. as predicted. Two of the pairwise compar-
isons are significant using the Mann-Whitney U, and none are signifi-
cant using the Bonferroni r-values. Finally, in the upper right panel of
table 4 we note that the coefficients for fraction of off-floor trading
increase, as predicted, with the successive off-floor treatments. In the
lower right panel block trading significantly increases off-floor trades
relative to single-unit trading, and the effect of experience is to further
significantly increase off-floor trading. Finally, in the upper left panel
of table 4 the coefficients for price variance in the constant relative to
the random environment have the predicted direction, and significantly
so, as shown in the lower left panel of table 4.
VI. Discussion and Conclusions
Our primary objective in this article was to investigate the incentive
conditions under which the phenomenon of off-floor trading might oc-
cur. We began with the simplest and most transparent environment
that might induce traders to leave an organized exchange to engage in
bilateral private trades: an environment in which the rate structure
provided lower transactions cost for block trades off floor than unit
trades on floor. This environment parallels that of U.S. financial mar-
kets before 1975 when the schedule of minimum brokerage fees did
not properly reflect the cost of block trades, and this helped to support
the "third market" in off-exchange trades. In experiment I off-floor
trading was permitted after period 5, and in periods 7-15 we observe
the predicted number (18) of off-floor trades. It is clear from this exper-
9, Direct comparison between the coefficients of C or R and ihose of OSC or OSR
are not meaningful since the latter use experienced subjects, the former inexperienced
subjects. We only make comparisons after controlling f^ or experience since experience
is expected to reduce spreads and price volatility.
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iment that by providing an off-floor cost advantage to all (or most)
traders one might precipitate a type of market failure in which ulti-
mately the on-floor trades were so thin that it would no longer provide
competitive price information to facilitate off-floor bilateral bargaining.
This experiment illustrates the important principle that on-floor broker-
age commissions must be competitive with the off-floor costs of direct
negotiation if market disintegration is to be avoided.
The environment of experiment 1 was that of stationary induced
supply-and-demand schedules, with each trader assigned unchanging
limit supply or demand prices. In this repealed static market, the natu-
rally occurring bid-ask spread converged toward the minimum possible
spread of I cent. In fact the median observed spread was only 1 cent
(table 2) across trading periods 6-10. It followed that, if we were to
study the incentive of traders to contract off floor at prices inside the
bid-ask spread, then it would be essential that we create an environ-
ment in which the naturally occurring bid-ask spread converged to a
larger level. We conjectured that this would be the case in supply/
demand environments in which (1) the buyer (seller) induced value
(cost) assignments were rerandomized repeatedly and (2) a random
constant was added (or subtracted) each period to all values and costs
to effect random shifts in supply and demand. We tested our conjecture
in three experiments (2-4) using condition I, yielding a constant com-
petitive equilibrium price, and two experiments (7-8) using conditions
1 and 2. yielding a random competitive equilibrium price. In the con-
stant environment, with only random reassignment of traders to value-
cost steps, we observed a much wider bid-ask spread than in experi-
ment I: a median spread of 10-14 cents in experiments 2-4 compared
with 1 cent in periods 6-10 of experiment I. Under conditions I and
2, which added a random shifting competitive equilibrium price, the
median observed bid-ask spread widened further to 24 and 18 cents,
respectively, in experiments 7 and 8 (table 2).
These findings, though they are ancillary to the primary objective of
the article, have important implications for modeling the bid-ask
spread in double-auction trading institutions. Traditional theories of
the bid-ask spread are of two kinds: (I) the bid-ask spread is a transac-
tions cost of the dealer or a specialist for providing the services of
immediacy (see Demsetz 1968), and (2) the bid-ask spread is due to
the existence of traders with superior information to that of the special-
ist (see Copeland and Galai 1983; and Gtosten and Milgrom 1985). One
should be aware that these models provide sufficient not necessary
conditions for the existence of a positive bid-ask spread. That they are
not necessary is shown by the hundreds of experimental double-
auction markets, and our baseline 2 experiments reported here, in
which a positive bid-ask spread persists; yet these are principals mar-
kets, without intermediate dealers or specialists, and transactions cost
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is minuscule. In many of these experiments, all individuals have identi-
cal (although uncertain) informiition on the value of the securities
traded (see Smith, Suchanek. and Williams 1988). Yet one observes a
bid-ask spread. A third theory is based on establishing that "the proba-
bility of a limit order executing does not rise to unity as the price at
which the order is placed gets infinitesimally close to a counterpart
(bid or ask) market quote" (see Cohen. Maier. Schwartz, and Whit-
comb 1981, p. 300). In terms of this theory, our success in inducing a
wider bid-ask spread by increasing uncertainty in the environment can
be attributed to the fact that we shifted the probability distribution that
a limit order will execute.
The next step in our research was to allow off-floor trading using
constant versus random supply-and-demand shifts, and single-unit ver-
sus block trading, as treatment variables (with no explicit trading cost
in either the electronic or off-floor transactions). Comparing experi-
ments with off-floor single-unit trading in the random environment with
those in the constant environment, we find more off-floor trading in the
former than in the latter (table 2), but the difference is not statistically
significant (table 4). We attribute the increase in off-floor trading with
Ihe random environment to the fact that the bid-ask spread is wider
than in the constant environment. But this is not documented because
we collected no data on the extent to which off-floor trades occurred
within the spread in experiments 5x-10\.
Comparing experiments using off-floor single-unit trading with those
having block trading (both using the random environment) we observe
more off-floor trading with blocks than with single units (table 2). and
the difference is significant (table 4). The reason for this appears to be
straightforward: in our experimental environment the subjective cost
of an off-floor trade (the effort in writing a bid or an offer, deciding
which of the two adjacent traders to give it to, then delivering the
quotation) is the same for a 3-unit block as for a single unit. Conse-
quently, an elementary transactions cost argument predicts more units
will trade off-floor under block trading than under single-unit trading.
Our last experiment (1 Ixx) used twice-experienced subjects and re-
corded the standing bid-ask spread at the time each off-floor block
bilateral trade proposal was made and. again, at the time when the
proposal was either rejected or accepted. In this experiment 27 of 35
off-floor (3-unit block) trades, or 77%, were inside the bid-ask spread at
the time of acceptance. This supports the hypothesis that the primary
motivation for such trades is to split the gains inherent in the standing
bid-ask spread, although there may exist block-trading advantages,
such as reduced uncertainty of execution, at prices outside the spread.
Furthermore, comparing off-floor trading using twice-experienced sub-
jects with that for only once-experienced subjects, we note a significant
increase in off-floor trading with experience (tables 2 and 4). Conse-
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quenlly. the phenomenon is not an artifact of trader inexperience. We
think this is because, with experience, traders become more skilled in
moving back and forth between the two markets and are able to handle
the demands of off-floor negotiation with less effort.
Finally, across treatments that are associated with an increase in
off-floor trading, we observe a monotonic decline in market efficiency
(table 4). This is evidence in favor of the hypothesis that otT-floor
trading is socially undesirable. (The fact that the decline is not signifi-
cant [table 41 in the pairwise comparison of adjacetU treatments moder-
ates this conclusion, although this result might be altered with in-
creased sample size.) But the results of this article are best interpreted
as providing only weak support for market degradation in the presence
of off-floor trading. Hence, off-floor trading may be less of a problem
for the social objective of maximizing the gains from exchange than it
is for the exchange firm that loses volume to bilateral traders wbo free
ride on the public price information generated by the exchange.
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